Name
Katherine Stovall v. New England Telephone Company
Insurance Company
Sedgwick CMS
Date Decided
June 3, 2025
Panel Members
Categories
Benefit Payments Res Judicata Procedure Statute of Limitations Durational Limit Findings of Fact Benefit Payments Durational Limit Findings of Fact Procedure Res Judicata Statute of LimitationsTags
File Size
553 KB
DownloadSummary from the Troubh Heisler Attorneys
Katherine Stovall v. New England Telephone Co. – 2025 ME 47- The Law Court vacates an Appellate division decision which has set aside the ALJ’s determination that Stovall did not meet her burden of proving that the statute of limitations on her 1996 injury had been tolled by subsequent payments made under a 2001 injury.
In Stovall, the Law Court recited the lengthy history of ALJ and Appellate Division decisions in this case. While not directly related to the statute of limitations holding, the discussion and footnotes provide excellent discussion of proper application of res judicata in workers’ compensation cases. In particular, on more than one occasion the Court takes the Appellate Division to task for ignoring its holding in Somers v. S.D. Warren Co., 2020 ME 139, 242 A.3d 1091 incorporating the “might have been litigated” standard. In prior decision in this case the Appellate Division failed to apply res judicata by limiting the standard to “actually litigated”. There is also good discussion of the interplay of board decree findings impact on the existence of compensation payment schemes and that the Appellate Division should not make factual determinations on appeal.
In 2021 the Appellate Division found the ALJ misapplied res judicata and remanded the case for determination of that issue and whether the 6-year statute of repose for a 1996 injury was tolled by payments made under a 2001 injury, which a prior decree found were an aggravation of the 1996 injury. The ALJ found that Stovall did not offer medical evidence which would have placed the employer on contemporaneous notice the payments under the 2001 may be related to the 1996 injury and that Stovall herself had not placed the employer on notice. There was a prior ALJ finding that the 1996 injury may have no longer played a role in her condition. Therefore, the petition was barred by the 6-year statute under 39-A MRSA sec. 306(2). The Appellate Division vacated that decision and the Law Court granted appellate review.
After reviewing tolling decisions of Pottle and Leighton, the Law Court noted that determination of whether the statute tolled was both a question of law and of fact. Further, it criticized the Appellate Division for substituting its own factual determinations in vacating the ALJ’s conclusion the petition was time barred. The standard was whether the ALJ was compelled to find that Stovall met her burden of proving the statute of repose was tolled. Based on factual findings in prior decisions, and by the ALJ in this litigation, the Law Court determined not only was the ALJ not compelled to make such finding but that the evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions.